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Although the expression of emotions in humans is considered to be largely universal, cul-
tural effects contribute to both emotion expression and recognition. To disentangle the
interplay between these factors, play-acted and authentic (non-instructed) vocal expres-
sions of emotions were used, on the assumption that cultural effects may contribute
differentially to the recognition of staged and spontaneous emotions. Speech tokens
depicting four emotions (anger, sadness, joy, fear) were obtained from German radio
archives and re-enacted by professional actors, and presented to 120 participants from
Germany, Romania, and Indonesia. Participants in all three countries were poor at distin-
guishing between play-acted and spontaneous emotional utterances (58.73% correct on
average with only marginal cultural differences). Nevertheless, authenticity influenced emo-
tion recognition: across cultures, anger was recognized more accurately when play-acted
(z =15.06, p<0.001) and sadness when authentic (z =6.63, p<0.001), replicating pre-
vious findings from German populations. German subjects revealed a slight advantage in
recognizing emotions, indicating a moderate in-group advantage. There was no difference
between Romanian and Indonesian subjects in the overall emotion recognition. Differential
cultural effects became particularly apparent in terms of differential biases in emotion attri-
bution. While all participants labeled play-acted expressions as anger more frequently than
expected, German participants exhibited a further bias toward choosing anger for sponta-
neous stimuli. In contrast to the German sample, Romanian and Indonesian participants
were biased toward choosing sadness.These results support the view that emotion recog-
nition rests on a complex interaction of human universals and cultural specificities.Whether
and in which way the observed biases are linked to cultural differences in self-construal
remains an issue for further investigation.
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INTRODUCTION
Emotions are an important part of human social life. They mediate
between the internal state and external world and they prepare the
organism for subsequent actions and interactions. Although there
is an ongoing debate about the definition of emotions (see for
example Mason and Capitanio, 2012; Mulligan and Scherer, 2012;
Scarantino, 2012), there is a growing consensus among theorists
that emotion needs to be viewed as a multi-component phenom-
enon (Scherer, 1984; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). The three major
components of emotions are neurophysiological response patterns
in the central and autonomic nervous systems; motor expression
in face, voice, and gesture; and subjective feelings. Many theorists
also include the evaluation or appraisal of the antecedent event
and the action tendencies generated by the emotion as additional
components of the emotional process (Scherer, 1984; Smith and
Ellsworth, 1985; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991).
Different theoretical frameworks have been put forward as to
whether emotions are universal and evolved adaptations (Darwin,
1872) or whether they are socially constructed and vary across
cultures (Averill, 1980). Both approaches are, however, not mutu-
ally exclusive, and it has recently been argued that the dichotomy
between nature and nurture should be abandoned (Prinz, 2004;
Juslin, 2012; Mason and Capitanio, 2012). Matsumoto (1989),
for example, argued that although emotions are biologically pro-
gramed, cultural factors have a strong influence on the control of
emotional expression and perception.
Scherer and Wallbott (1994) conducted a series of cross-
cultural questionnaire studies in 37 countries to investigate the
influence of culture on the experience of emotions and found
strong evidence for both universality and cultural specificity in
emotional experience, including both psychological and physi-
ological responses to emotions. Ekman and colleagues (Ekman
et al., 1969; Ekman and Friesen, 1971; Ekman and Oster, 1979)
tested the universality of facial expressions and demonstrated that
a standardized set of photographs depicting different emotion
expressions was correctly judged by members of different, partly
preliterate, cultures. At the same time, recognition accuracy was
higher for members of the cultural background from which the
facial expressions were obtained. Thus, facial expressions are con-
sidered to be largely universal (but, see Jack et al., 2012), while
cultural differences are observed in the types of situations that elicit
emotions (Matsumoto and Hwang, 2011), in small dialectic-like
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differences (Elfenbein et al., 2007), and in the culture-specific dis-
play rules that alter facial expressions (Ekman and Friesen, 1969;
Matsumoto et al., 2008).
The human voice is also an important modality in the trans-
mission of emotional information, both through verbal and non-
verbal utterances (Banse and Scherer, 1996; Juslin and Laukka,
2003; Hammerschmidt and Jürgens, 2007; Sauter et al., 2010).
Expression of emotion in the voice occurs via modifications of
voice quality (Gobl and Ni Chasaide, 2003) and prosody in general
(Scherer, 1986). Initial research on vocal emotion recognition indi-
cated that the patterns in prosodic recognition were largely univer-
sal (Frick, 1985), which paralleled the results from facial expres-
sions (Elfenbein and Ambady, 2002). Ratings of vocalizations by
listeners showed that they were able to infer vocally expressed emo-
tions at rates higher than chance (Banse and Scherer, 1996; Juslin
and Laukka, 2003). In a classic study, Scherer et al. (2001) com-
pared judgments by Germans and members of eight other cultures
on expressions of emotions by German actors. They found that
with increasing geographical distance from the speakers the recog-
nition accuracy for emotional expressions decreased. Additionally,
recognition accuracy was greater for foreign judges whose own lan-
guage was closer to the Germanic language family. A meta-analysis
on emotion recognition within and across cultures revealed that
the in-group advantage found by Scherer et al. (2001) for German
judges is a typical finding in cross-cultural emotion recogni-
tion studies (Elfenbein and Ambady, 2002). This meta-analysis
included studies that used different types of stimuli, from facial
and whole-body photographs to voice samples and video clips.
Emotions were universally recognized at better-than-chance levels.
However, there was also a consistent in-group advantage: accuracy
was higher when emotions were both expressed and recognized
by members of the same national, ethnic, or regional group. This
advantage was smaller for cultural groups with greater exposure
to one another, measured in terms of living in the same nation,
physical proximity, and telephone communication (Elfenbein and
Ambady, 2002).
Cultural variations in emotion recognition can not only be
explained by differences in the emotion encoding, but also by
response biases on part of the recipient due to culture-dependent
decoding rules (Matsumoto, 1989; Elfenbein et al., 2002). For
example, revealing that Japanese participants were less accurate in
recognizing anger, fear, disgust, and sadness, Matsumoto (1992)
suggested a bias against negative emotions in collectivistic soci-
eties as an important factor to maintain group stability (but, see
Elfenbein et al., 2002 for divergent results).
Much of the research cited above has been performed on
stereotypical and controlled expressions of emotions often pro-
duced by actors. Though actors spend many years perfecting
the authenticity and clarity of their portrayals of human behav-
ior and emotions (Goldstein and Bloom, 2011), acted emo-
tional expressions may still be more stereotyped and more
intense than spontaneous expressions (Wilting et al., 2006;
Laukka et al., 2012, but, see Jürgens et al., 2011; Scherer,
2013), and are thought to be more strongly bound by social
codes (Hunt, 1941; Matsumoto et al., 2009). In addition, pres-
elected, stereotypical expressions might conceal possible effects
of response biases in cross-culture studies due to their clear and
unmistakable expression patterns (Wagner, 1993; Elfenbein et al.,
2002).
In a series of previous studies we presented listeners with
emotional speech tokens produced without external instruction
(“authentic”) obtained from radio archives, as well as correspond-
ing tokens re-enacted by professional actors (“play-acted”). We
found that (German) listeners were poor at distinguishing between
authentic and play-acted emotions. Intriguingly, the recording
conditions nevertheless had a significant effect on emotion recog-
nition. Anger was recognized best when play-acted, while sadness
was recognized best when authentic (Drolet et al., 2012). Moreover,
using an fMRI approach, we found that both explicit recognition
of the source of the recording, i.e., whether it was authentic or
play-acted (compared to the recognition of emotion) and authen-
tic stimuli (versus play-acted) lead to an up-regulation in the ToM
network (medial prefrontal, retrosplenial, and temporoparietal
cortices). Moreover, acoustic analyses revealed significant differ-
ences in the F0 contour, with a higher variability in F0 modulation
in play-acted than authentic stimuli (Jürgens et al., 2011).
Based on these findings, we here aim to expand our under-
standing of the recognition of play-acted and authentic stimuli and
biases in emotion recognition. By testing participants from differ-
ent cultures we intended to gain insights into the influence culture
has on our findings. We selected Romanian and Indonesian partic-
ipants because they differ in terms of the distance to the German
sample, with a higher degree of overlap between the Romanian and
German cultures than between Indonesian and German. More-
over, Romania and Indonesia have been described as collectivistic
societies in contrast to the individualistic German society (Hofst-
ede, 1980, 1996; Trimbitas et al., 2007), which allows a comparison
of listeners’ culture-dependent response biases on non-instructed,
more ambivalent speech tokens (Matsumoto,1992; Elfenbein et al.,
2002). If the observed interaction between emotion recognition
and recording condition is based on universal processes in emo-
tion recognition, we would predict a similar pattern across the
three cultures. Specifically, more stereotyped displays should be
recognized more easily across cultures (Elfenbein et al., 2007). If,
in contrast, acting reflects a socially learned code, then the higher
recognition of play-acted anger should disappear in the other two
cultures (Hunt, 1941; Matsumoto et al., 2009), with a stronger
effect in Indonesian than Romanian participants, due to cultural
distance. If collectivistic societies foster a response bias against
negative emotions, Romanian and Indonesian participants should
reveal a bias against judging an emotion as anger, fear, or sadness
in contrast to the German participants (Matsumoto, 1992; Elfen-
bein et al., 2002). This effect should be increased in cases in which
the stimulus material is less clear and less stereotypical (Wagner,
1993; Elfenbein et al., 2002).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
RECORDINGS
We focused on four emotions that differ in terms of valence, dom-
inance, and intensity: anger, fear, joy, and sadness (de Vignemont
and Singer, 2006; Bryant and Barrett, 2008; Ethofer et al., 2009).
These are the most commonly used emotions in this field of
research (Sobin and Alpert, 1999; Scherer et al., 2001; Juslin and
Laukka, 2003) and were accessible in the radio interviews used for
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stimulus material. Neutral prosody, while interesting for compar-
ative reasons, is rare and hard to control in real-life settings. One
possibility, news anchors, whose voices are characterized by neutral
prosody, unfortunately represent a way of speaking more related
to acting than to natural speech. We compared emotional expres-
sions that were obtained during radio interviews to re-enacted
versions of the same stimuli. The authentic speech recordings were
selected from the database of a radio station and consisted of Ger-
man expressions of fear, anger, joy, or sadness. The recordings were
made during interviews with individuals talking in an emotional
fashion about a highly charged ongoing or recollected event (e.g.,
parents speaking about the death of their children, people win-
ning in a lottery, being in rage about current or past injustice,
or threatened by a current danger). Emotions were ascertained
through the content of the text spoken by the individuals, as well
as the context. While the possibility of social acting can never be
completely excluded we aimed to minimize this effect by exclud-
ing clearly staged settings (e.g., talk-shows). Stimuli were saved in
wave format with 44.1 kHz sample rate and 16 bit sampling depth.
Only recordings of good quality and low background noise were
selected. Prior to the experiment, we asked 64 naïve participants
to rate the transcripts for emotional content to ensure that the
stimulus material was free of verbal content that could reveal the
emotion. Text segments that were assigned to a particular emotion
above chance level were shortened or deleted from the stimulus
set. Thus, the stimuli that were used in the experiment did not
contain any keywords that could allow inference of the expressed
emotion, as for example: “I have known him for 43 years” (trans-
lation; original German: “Ich kenn ihn 43 Jahr”) was used as a
sad stimulus, and “up to the window crossbar” (German: “bis zum
Fensterkreuz”) as a fear stimulus. Of the chosen 80 speech tokens,
35 were made outdoors and varied in their noise surroundings.
The final stimulus set consisted of 20 samples of joy and sadness,
22 samples of anger, and 18 samples of fear, half of which were
recorded from female speakers, resulting in a total of 80 record-
ings made by 78 different speakers. Segments had a mean length
of 1.9 s (SD: 1.2 s). These wave files represent the so-called authen-
tic stimuli. An information sheet was prepared for each authentic
stimulus, which indicated the gender of the speaker, the context
of the situation described, and a transliteration of the spoken text
surrounding and including the respective selection of text.
The play-acted stimuli were produced by 21 male and 21 female
actors (incl. 31 professional actors, 10 drama students, and 1
professional singer) recruited in Berlin, Hanover, and Göttingen,
Germany. Actors were asked to reproduce two to three of the
authentic recordings. Using the recording information sheet, the
actors were told to express the respective text and emotion in their
own way, using only the text, identified context, and emotion (the
segment to be used as stimulus was not indicated and the actors
never heard the original recording). Each actor could practice as
long as needed, could repeat the acted reproduction as often as
they required, and the recording selected for experimental use was
the repetition each actor denoted as their first choice. To reduce
any category effects between authentic and play-acted stimuli, the
environment for the play-acted recordings was varied and 30 out of
80 randomly selected re-enactments were recorded outside. Nev-
ertheless, care was taken to avoid excessive background noise. The
relevant play-acted recordings (wave format, 44.1 kHz, 16 bit sam-
pling depth) were then edited so they contained the same segment
of spoken text as the authentic recordings. The average amplitude
of all stimuli was equalized with AvisoftSASLab Pro Recorder v4.40
(Avisoft Bioacoustics, Berlin, Germany).
ETHICS
It was not possible to obtain informed consent from the people
whose radio statements were used, as these were not individually
identified. The brevity of the speech samples also precluded indi-
vidual identification; we thus deemed the use of these samples
as ethically acceptable. Actors gave verbal informed consent and
were paid C20; experimental participants gave written informed
consent and were paid C5 for their participation. Both actors and
participants were informed afterward about the purpose of the
study.
PROCEDURE
Due to the unequal numbers of speakers in the two conditions,
we split the dataset in two and presented the two sets (playback A
and playback B) to different groups of listeners. This also served to
avoid participant exhaustion. Each set contained five authentic and
five corresponding play-acted duplicates per speaker gender and
intended emotion, resulting in a total of 80 stimuli (40 authentic,
40 play-acted) per set. Apart from three exceptions the playbacks
were prepared in such a way that each actor was present in one
set only once and related recordings (authentic versus play-acted)
were presented in a pseudo-randomized fashion with the stipu-
lation that speech token pairs were not played immediately after
each another to make direct comparisons between recording pairs
unlikely.
Each of the two sets of stimuli was presented to 20 listeners (10
female and 10 male) per country, resulting in 40 participants per
country. In Germany, all participants were native German speakers
recruited at the Georg-August University, Göttingen. Thirty-six
were students, three were Ph.D. students, and one was an assis-
tant lecturer. The age of German listeners varied between 20 and
33 years, the average age was M = 24.4, SD= 2.8 years for the
listeners of playback A and M = 25.1, SD= 3.0 years for the lis-
teners of playback B. The 40 Romanian listeners were recruited
at the Lucian-Blaga-University of Sibiu, Romania. All of them
were students. The age of Romanian listeners varied between 18
and 22 years, the mean age was M = 20.0, SD= 1.2 years for the
listeners of playback A and M = 19.5, SD= 0.7 years for the lis-
teners of playback B. The 40 Indonesian listeners were recruited
at the Jakarta University, Indonesia. All Indonesian participants
were students aged 18–31 years. The mean age was M = 20.7,
SD= 2.8 years for the listeners of playback A and M = 20.5,
SD= 1.9 years for the listeners of playback B. Neither the Roman-
ian nor the Indonesian participants spoke any German. Romanian
participants were, however, more familiar with German due to a
large German community in the town of Sibiu. We did not col-
lect any information about the emotional state of the participants
before or during the experiments.
The stimuli were played back using a laptop (Toshiba Satellite
with a Realtek AC97 Soundcard) via a program called Emosurvey
(developed by Martin Schmeisser). Participants heard the stimuli
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via earphones (Sennheiser HD 497). They could activate the play-
back of the stimuli themselves and each stimulus could be activated
a maximum of three times. The ratings were made via mouse clicks
on the screen. When all questions were answered, the next stimulus
could be activated. The listeners’ ratings were automatically saved
in a log file, which could afterward be transferred to other soft-
ware packages for analysis. In a forced-choice design participants
were asked to determine, for each stimulus, the emotion expressed
(emotion rating: joy, fear, anger, sadness), and whether the emo-
tion was authentic or play-acted (dichotomous authenticity rating:
authentic, play-acted).
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
All models were implemented in the R statistical computing
environment (R Developmental Core Team, 2008). We ana-
lyzed the authenticity ratings as well as the emotion rat-
ings with generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) using
the glmer function from the lme4 package for binomial data
(Bates, 2005). The responses for correct authenticity rating
and for correct emotion rating were tested with the predic-
tor variables Country, Intended emotion, Stimulus authenticity,
as well as their interactions, and the random factors Partici-
pant and Text stimulus (model formulation: correct recogni-
tion∼Country× Emotion×Authenticity+Random factor Text
stimulus+Random factor Participant). Both models (Authentic-
ity rating and Emotion rating) were compared to their respective
null models (including only the intercept and the random factors,
model formulation: correct recognition∼ 1+Random factor Text
stimulus+Random factor Participant) using a likelihood ratio
test (function ANOVA with the test argument “Chisq”). This com-
parison revealed differences, such that each of the full models
accounted for more variance than the null models. Based on the
chosen model we specified a set of experimental hypotheses that
we tested post hoc using the glht function from the multcomp
package (Hothorn et al., 2008), adjusting the p-values for multiple
testing via single-step method.
Assessing recognition accuracy by simply counting hit rates,
without addressing potential false alarms or biases (a strong prefer-
ence toward one response), can be misleading (Wagner, 1993). For
instance, if participants have a strong preference for rating stimuli
as “authentic,” then one would obtain high hit rates for “authen-
tic” speech tokens, but also many wrongly classified play-acted
ones (called false alarms). Although the mean recognition rate in
this case is quite high, the true ability to recognize authenticity is
low. This example shows the importance of calculating biases for
understanding rating behavior. A standardized method for ana-
lyzing the true discrimination ability for two response options was
first introduced as Signal Detection Theory (SDT; Tanner et al.,
1954). This technique offers both a measure of discriminatory abil-
ity d ′ (also called sensitivity) which is the true ability to discern one
stimulus from another, and a measure of the response bias toward
one category, which is independent of sensitivity (criterion c). As
the emotion recognition task in our study included four response
options (four emotions), we analyzed the ratings using Choice
Theory (Luce, 1959, 1963; Smith, 1982). Choice theory is a logit-
model analog to SDT, which allows the analysis of more than two
discrete response categories. A Choice Theory analysis provides
(1) the participants’ relative bias (b), which is the equivalent crite-
rion c and (2) dissimilarity values (α), which are equivalent to the
discriminatory ability d ′.
We implemented the choice theory analysis as a baseline-
category logit-model (Agresti, 2007). We used the fitted intercept
and slope coefficients to derive the bias and similarity parameters
of choice theory. The binomial “mixed” model for authenticity
recognition (binomial due to the two response options“authentic”
and “play-acted”) was calculated in R using the glmer function of
the lme4 package (Bates, 2005). The multinomial “mixed” model
for emotion recognition was programed under WinBUGS (Lunn
et al., 2000) using the R2WinBUGS interface package (Sturtz et al.,
2005) to account for the four response options (“anger,” “fear,”
“sadness,” and “joy”).
RESULTS
AUTHENTICITY RECOGNITION
Across cultures, recognition accuracy for authenticity was only
slightly above chance (M = 58.73%, SD= 8.84%), with a higher
recognition rate for authentic (M = 67.81%, SD= 12.37) than
for play-acted speech tokens (M = 49.58%, SD= 16.78). Post hoc
tests confirmed this difference in recognition rates (z = 18.39,
p< 0.001; Figure 1). German raters, correct in 62.43% of cases,
were, on average, more accurate in their authenticity ratings
than either Romanian (57.20%) or Indonesian raters (56.67%;
German – Romanian z = 2.99, p= 0.028; German – Indonesian
z = 2.95, p= 0.031).
The analysis of ratings using choice theory revealed that partic-
ipants had a strong bias toward choosing the response “authentic”
in the authenticity ratings (Figure 2),which may explain the higher
recognition accuracy for authentic speech tokens. The post hoc
pair-wise comparisons between the participants of the different
countries revealed a significantly greater bias in Romanians than
Germans (z = 2.64, p= 0.045; Figure 2).
The overall mean dissimilarity of 0.40 implies a gener-
ally low discriminatory capability between authentic and play-
acted vocal expressions of emotions (MacMillan and Creelman,
2005). Post hoc tests revealed that German participants had a
higher dissimilarity value and thus a better discriminatory ability
than Romanian and Indonesian participants (German-Romanian:
z = 4.535, p< 0.001; German – Indonesian: z = 4.590, p< 0.001).
EMOTION RECOGNITION
In total, the correct response rate in emotion ratings was 40.65%
(SD= 6.41%), which is higher than a chance response rate of
25% resulting from a random selection of one of the four emo-
tions. The emotion recognition ratings in general showed similar
patterns in the three countries (Figure 3). The GLMM analysis
revealed that the rate of correct emotion recognition was influ-
enced by Intended emotion, Stimulus authenticity, and Country
(see Table 1 for the results of the post hoc analysis). Play-acted
stimuli were recognized more accurately (42.78%) than authen-
tic stimuli (38.52%). Specifically, play-acted anger was recognized
more frequently than authentic anger and authentic sadness more
than play-acted sadness. Authenticity did not significantly influ-
ence the emotion recognition rates for fear and joy. Concerning
the four emotion categories, anger and sadness were on average
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FIGURE 1 | Probability of correct authenticity recognition by intended
emotion (A – anger, F – fear, J – joy, S – sadness) and stimulus
authenticity (authentic or play-acted). The data are split by cultural
affiliation (G – Germany, R – Romania, I – Indonesia). Given are means and
95% confidence intervals. The probability of correct authenticity recognition
by chance is 0.5 as indicated by the dashed horizontal lines.
FIGURE 2 | Discrimination of authentic and play-acted vocal expressions
of emotions as assessed by choice theory. The discriminatory ability is
described by the dissimilarity between authentic and play-acted stimuli
(depicting how well the stimuli could be discriminated) and by the
participants’ relative bias toward choosing authentic as a response, which are
plotted against each other. The figure shows how these parameters vary in
dependence of cultural affiliation (G – Germany, R – Romania, I – Indonesia)
and the intended emotional content (A – anger, F – fear, J – joy, S – sadness).
Positive values on the x -axis indicate a bias toward preferentially choosing the
response “authentic,” while higher dissimilarity values indicates a better
ability to distinguish the stimuli. Data are given are as means±95%
confidence intervals.
recognized significantly more frequently than fear and sadness
was recognized more frequently than joy. Finally, emotion recog-
nition rates were significantly higher for German participants in
comparison to Romanian and Indonesian participants, but not for
Romanian participants in comparison to Indonesian participants
(Table 1).
The response bias for emotion judgments was calculated
with respect to cultural affiliation and stimulus authentic-
ity. In all three countries participants showed a bias toward
rating play-acted stimuli as angry (Figure 4). This bias was
higher for German than for Romanian or Indonesian par-
ticipants. German participants were also biased toward rat-
ing authentic stimuli as angry, while Romanian and Indone-
sian participants preferentially chose “sadness” and were addi-
tionally biased against choosing “anger” when rating authen-
tic stimuli. There was no effect of authenticity or coun-
try of origin with respect to the responses “joy” and “fear.”
Indonesian participants, whose bias against “joy” was less distinct
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FIGURE 3 | Probability of correct emotion recognition. Given is the
probability of correct emotion recognition with respect to the intended
emotion (A – anger, F – fear, J – joy, S – sadness) and stimulus
authenticity (authentic or play-acted). The data are split by cultural
affiliation (G – Germany, R – Romania, I – Indonesia). Given are means
and 95% confidence intervals. The probability of correct emotion
recognition by chance is 0.25 as indicated by the dashed horizontal
lines.
Table 1 | Post hoc tests of cultural affiliation, and stimulus-specific
factors (stimulus authenticity, intended emotion) on the probability
of correct emotion recognition.
Linear hypotheses Estimate Std. error z Value Pr (>|z |)
Auth–play==0 −0.175602 0.046608 −3.768 0.00226**
Germany–Romania==0 0.291267 0.059652 4.883 <0.001***
Germany–Indonesia==0 0.351577 0.059665 −5.893 <0.001***
Romania–Indonesia==0 0.06031 0.06036 0.999 0.97849
A–F==0 1.22244 0.242372 5.044 <0.001***
A–J==0 0.536029 0.233757 2.293 0.23193
A–S==0 −0.193133 0.233599 −0.827 0.99434
J–F==0 0.686411 0.247431 2.774 0.06781
S–F==0 1.415573 0.247282 5.725 <0.001***
S–J==0 0.729162 0.238845 3.053 0.02912*
Auth–play (A)==0 −1.356013 0.090051 −15.058 <0.001***
Auth–play (F)==0 0.077003 0.105342 0.731 0.99776
Auth–play (J)==0 −0.007027 0.088324 −0.08 1
Auth–play (S)==0 0.583629 0.088031 6.63 <0.001***
The p-values are adjusted for multiple testing. Auth – non-instructed; play –
instructed; A – anger; F – fear; J – joy; S – sadness. *p< 0.05; **p<0.01;
***p<0.001.
than for Romanian or German participants, were the only
exception.
The outcome of the calculation of the dissimilarity values for all
possible stimulus-response pairs during emotion ratings (includ-
ing effects of country and stimulus authenticity) are shown in
Figure 5. There were few differences between authentic and play-
acted emotional expressions and between the participants of the
three countries. High dissimilarity values were found between
anger and sadness, which indicates that these emotions could be
distinguished easily. The very low dissimilarity values for the stim-
ulus“fear”(see row“F”in the matrix plot in Figure 5) indicate high
confusion with the other emotion categories and reflect the low
recognition rates for fear.
DISCUSSION
Participants in all three cultures had difficulties distinguish-
ing between authentic (spontaneous) and play-acted (instructed)
emotional expressions. The recognition of the expressed emotion
also showed relatively low rates, but varied with respect to the emo-
tion category and listener country of origin. Notably, the stimulus
origin (authentic versus play-acted) had a clear impact on the
recognition of vocal expressions of anger and sadness across all
three cultures: anger was recognized more frequently when play-
acted and sadness was recognized at higher rates when authentic,
bolstering earlier findings for an independent German population
(Drolet et al., 2012). While these results are significant, it remains
unclear what leads to this effect. It may be that play-acted anger is
more exaggerated than spontaneously expressed anger, while sad-
ness, in contrast, is more difficult to play-act. On the other hand, it
may be that, overall, some stimulus feature makes play-acted stim-
uli more likely to be perceived as anger and spontaneous stimuli
as sadness.
With regard to our initial hypotheses, we found support for
the conjecture that play-acted anger was recognized with higher
accuracy than authentic anger across cultures, possibly because
of its stereotypical nature. For the other three categories, acting
does not necessarily appear to be connected with a more exagger-
ated expression, which is contrary to previous results (Barkhuy-
sen et al., 2007; Laukka et al., 2012). According to our results,
play-acted expressions do not represent a socially learned code
(Matsumoto et al., 2009). Considering the similar interaction of
emotion recognition and stimulus authenticity across the three
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FIGURE 4 | Analysis of emotion recognition data by choice theory.
Given is the log-transformed response bias for each of the four possible
choices (anger, fear, joy, sadness) with respect to cultural affiliation
(G – Germany, R – Romania, I – Indonesia). The filled and open symbols
indicate the response bias for authentic and play-acted stimuli. Data are
given as means and 95% uncertainty interval. In the absence of any bias,
all four log-transformed bias values would be zero. Positive values indicate
a bias toward choosing the response named in the headline, whereas a
value below zero indicates a bias against choosing the respective
response.
FIGURE 5 | Analysis of emotion recognition data using choice theory.
Given is the dissimilarity for different pairs of emotion stimuli with respect to
cultural affiliation (G – Germany, R – Romania, I – Indonesia). The rows and
columns of this matrix plot indicate the four emotion stimuli (A – anger,
F – fear, J – joy, S – sadness) and the four possible responses (anger, fear, joy,
sadness), respectively. Filled and open symbols refer to authentic and
play-acted conditions, respectively. Data are given as means and 95%
uncertainty interval. The dissimilarity describes how well each stimulus
(depicted by rows) is discriminated from each other stimulus (depicted by
response columns).
cultures, our findings lend further support for the notion that
emotion recognition is underpinned by human universals.
The fact that listeners of all three cultures were poor at dis-
criminating between authentic and play-acted vocalizations shows
that previous findings (Drolet et al., 2012) are applicable cross-
culturally. If emotional expressions are indicators for underlying
states that may require behavioral responses by the observer (see
for controversial discussion, Russell et al., 2003; Barrett, 2011), the
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ability to detect fake emotional expressions should be important
and evolutionarily adaptive (Schmidt and Cohn, 2001; Mehu and
Scherer, 2012). The inability to distinguish between play-acted and
spontaneous expressions is, therefore, counter-intuitive, but has
also been found in previous studies (see for corresponding results,
Ekman and O’Sullivan, 1991; Audibert et al., 2008). People tend
to believe in the truthfulness of a statement rather than mistrust
it (Zuckerman et al., 1984; Levine et al., 1999). This effect, labeled
as “truth bias,” is reflected in our participants’ bias to choose the
answer “authentic” when asked about the encoding condition of
the emotional expression. It may be that the social cost of ignoring
an emotion in others (miss) or wrongly considering others to be
deceivers (false alarm) may make a bias toward believing in the
authenticity of social signals advantageous (Ekman, 1996).
In addition to the well documented in-group effect for Ger-
man participants (Scherer et al., 2001; Elfenbein and Ambady,
2002) in both emotion and authenticity recognition, cultural
effects mainly became apparent in rating biases of emotions and
not in recognition accuracy or dissimilarity. This has also been
demonstrated by Sneddon et al. (2011), who showed that emo-
tional stimuli were recognized similarly across different cultures,
although the intensity ratings varied. Our initial hypothesis that
Indonesian and Romanian participants exhibit a bias against neg-
ative emotions was, however, only partially supported. They had,
in accordance to our hypothesis, a clear bias against selecting
“anger,” but only for authentic stimuli. When listening to the
spontaneous speech tokens, Indonesian and Romanian partici-
pants preferentially chose “sadness.” No cultural difference was
found for the selection of “fear.” German participants showed
a bias toward selecting “anger” for both authentic and play-
acted stimuli. According to the hypothesis that individualistic
cultures are expected to reinforce the expression of negative emo-
tions, German participants may have expected a higher likelihood
of being confronted with expressions of anger based on their
everyday experiences, regardless of the stimulus type presented.
Conversely, the more collectivistic Romanian and Indonesian par-
ticipants may have expected expressions of sadness to be more
likely (see Matsumoto, 1989 for similar results). Thus, sadness
seems to rank differently compared to anger and the lumping of
all negative emotions in the context of response bias seems to
be an over-simplification, which might also explain the absence
of clear bias effects in previous studies (Elfenbein et al., 2002;
Sneddon et al., 2011). Interestingly, the expected response bias
against “anger” for the Romanian and Indonesian participants
is only present for authentic stimuli, which can be explained by
stimulus-inherent features of the play-acted speech tokens over-
riding the response bias (Wagner, 1993; Elfenbein et al., 2002). The
link between putative cultural biases requires stronger empirical
investigations before firm conclusions can be drawn, in particular
regarding limitations on the number and types of countries exam-
ined (with respect to language and cultural distance). However,our
results demonstrate that the implicit effects of authenticity clearly
derive from a complex interaction between stimulus-inherent fea-
tures and cultural expectations about the likelihood of specific
emotional expressions.
Due to the use of spontaneous emotional expressions taken
from anonymous radio interviews, our study did not allow for a
within-speaker design. We thus could not explicitly test whether
individual differences in speaker expressivity affected the results.
However, the large number of radio speakers and actors involved
(more than generally seen in comparable studies) allowed us to
minimize the influences of such effects. Additionally, the recog-
nition rates of fear and joy were quite low compared to previous
studies on vocal expressions of emotions (e.g.,Van Bezooijen et al.,
1983; Scherer et al., 2001; Pell and Kotz, 2011). This is interesting,
taking into account that not only the spontaneous emotions, for
which a low recognition would have been predicted, but also the
play-acted ones, revealed recognition rates near chance levels. In
contrast to standard methodology, we did not use exaggerated
emotional expressions, preselected speech tokens, or emotional
outbursts in a word or two (Van Bezooijen et al., 1983; Scherer
et al., 2001; Pell et al., 2009). Actors were provided with longer
transcripts (several sentences) to portray emotionally to ensure sit-
uations as similar to the authentic recordings as possible. It seems
unlikely that specifically these professional actors were unable to
encode joy or fear, considering that this has been done by laymen
and inexperienced actors before (Van Bezooijen et al., 1983; Pell
et al., 2009). In particular, the low recognition rates for joy and
fear at or close to chance levels might reveal interesting facts about
emotional expressions in general. The inability to recognize fear
may indicate that fear is less clear in segments of longer speech
samples than previously thought. In fact, we believe that the low
recognition rates overall is what made the discovery of the inter-
action with authenticity, as well as the differences in the response
bias, possible. It is clear that further work in this direction is needed
to understand the relevance of emotion recognition research to
day-to-day life. Nevertheless, the cross-cultural results revealed
that spontaneous and play-acted emotional expressions are recog-
nized similarly across cultures, indicating that both the recognition
of play-acted and spontaneous emotional expressions rest on a
similar universal basis. Furthermore, our results emphasize the
importance of rating response biases, especially regarding more
ambiguous expressions such as those taken from spontaneous
situations.
CONCLUSION
Combining all results, this study supports the view that emotion
recognition rests on a complex interplay between human univer-
sals and cultural specificities. On the one hand, we found the same
pattern of recognition and the same implicit effects of encoding
conditions across cultures; on the other hand, cultural differences
became evident in distinct biases. In addition, although the low
recognition of encoding conditions would appear to argue for
acted stimuli in vocal research, the implicit effects on emotion
recognition seen here indicate that the design of future studies
on vocal emotion recognition must take this variation in stimulus
characteristics into account.
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